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1. Introduction 
The European Union countries are increasingly concerned about their competitiveness 
in the global market. One of the central issues is related to the functioning of the labour 
market and social protection systems. In frequent comparisons of the US and the EU 
labour market, the latter has been considered more regulated and rigid, which again has 
been associated with higher unemployment rates. On the other hand, labour in Europe 
enjoys higher social protection standards. Under the pressure of global processes, 
current trends are towards adjustments in tax-benefit systems, which could increase 
work incentives and improve flexibility of labour market without scaling back social 
protection too much (Carone and Salomäki, 2001). Also the re-launched Lisbon 
Strategy and the underpinning integrated guidelines advocate more employment 
friendly tax-benefit systems. 
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 introduced new member states, which, having 
relatively decentralised labour markets, also contrast with the EU-15 countries. There 
are some concerns that this could lead to social dumping. In this context, the new 
member states have a dilemma as to which way to proceed – continuing the market-
oriented flexible approach or shifting to a more centralised bargaining and protective 
system. There is some empirical evidence that a bell-shaped relationship exists between 
the centralisation of wage bargaining and the unemployment level (Calmfors and 
Driffill, 1988), possibly making choices in-between relatively unfavourable. 
In this paper we take Estonia as one example of the new member states and try to 
answer whether it would be beneficial to implement a tax-benefit system more akin to 
those found in the old EU countries. Estonia is a small open economy conducting liberal 
economic and tax policy. Recent and on-going tax-benefit reforms aimed at lowering 
the income tax burden and to increase unemployment and subsistence benefits represent 
a good opportunity to model the outcome under various wage formation hypotheses.  
We adopt a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model initially developed for 
Finnish economy as a part of the TAXBEN project, see Alho (2006), but also with 
elements from the models of Bovenberg et al. (2000) for Dutch and Hinnosaar (2004a, 
b) for Estonian economy. 
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The main features of the model are the following. There are two production factors – 
capital and labour, the latter divided further into three skill groups based on educational 
attainment. Firms are symmetric and produce one homogenous good. The goods market 
is characterised by monopolistic competition, implying positive profits for firms. The 
foreign sector is not explicitly modelled, domestic firms compete with foreign firms in 
the international market and it is assumed that the domestic price level of goods equals 
the international price level. Households earn labour income, receive distributed profits 
and unemployment benefits. Their utility depends on leisure, private consumption, on 
which all the income is spent, and public consumption. Government has a passive role 
of spending all tax income on unemployment benefits and public consumption. Tax 
revenue is generated by income taxes on labour and capital and employers’ social 
security contributions. Throughout the model, functions with constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) have been used (e.g. for production, aggregation of production 
factors, utility). 
Three different structures of wage formation are modelled. First, fixed wages, which in 
case of a tax-benefit policy change would reflect the first reaction in the (very) short 
run. Second, market determined wages, which may correspond to the Estonian case 
under current circumstances in the medium run. (We do not consider the long run as 
capital is held fixed.) Third, wage bargaining by each skill group, representing a more 
EU-oriented hypothetical case. 
Overall, labour supply and wage bargaining are modelled in the manner of Bovenberg et 
al. (2000) and Hinnosaar (2004a, b), while the production side and other wage 
formation schemes (fixed and market determined) are modelled as in Alho (2006). A 
more detailed comparison of the previous models and the current approach is presented 
in Appendix 1. 
General equilibrium effects of Estonian tax-benefit system have not been extensively 
researched. To our knowledge, there are no previous studies apart from Hinnosaar 
(2004a, b). Compared to the latter, we consider several alternative wage formation 
systems. We also introduce capital as a production factor, although fixed, and employ 
more recent data. Additionally, having available a similar model to the Finnish case 
allows to compare tax-benefit effects on employment in an old and a new member state, 
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where the coverage of wage bargaining differs notably; 90% and 20-30%, respectively, 
in 2003 (European Industrial Relations Observatory, 2005). Modelling several skill 
groups allows us also to analyse separately the situation of low-skilled labour, whose 
employment rate is particularly low (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Employment rate, unemployment rate and educational level in Estonia, 
1997-2004 
Employment rate, %
5
20
35
50
65
80
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
below upper secondary
 
Unemployment rate, %
0
5
10
15
20
25
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
upper secondary tertiary
 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia 
 
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 discusses the model. 
Section 3 presents the data and the results of the calibration. Section 4 considers 
different policy simulations (lowering the marginal income tax rate, increasing the 
income tax allowance, lowering employers’ social security contributions and increasing 
the unemployment benefit replacement rate). Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The model 
2.1. Households1 
The workforce consists of three types of households differing in skills based on 
educational attainment: low-skilled, skilled and high-skilled ( 3,2,1=i ). There are Mi 
households in each skill category who maximise utility subject to a budget constraint 
and a time constraint. The utility of household j with skill level i is a function of private 
consumption jiC , leisure 
j
iV and public consumption G . The latter enters in an 
additively separable way, therefore having no effect on labour supply decisions2: 
)(),( GgVChH ji
j
i
j
i +=  (1) 
The utility sub-function is the CES type: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11111 1),( −−− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+= δ
δ
δ
δ
δδ
δ
δ j
ii
j
ii
j
i
j
i VdCdVCh  (2) 
where δ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure and di is a 
distribution parameter implying the relative weights which households place on 
consumption and labour supply. A household’s budget constraint is 
j
i
j
ii
L
i PCSWt =− )1(  (3) 
where Lit  is the average tax rate on labour income (a function of labour income, tax 
rates and tax free allowance), Wi is the gross wage rate, jiS  is labour supply and P is the 
price level. Households also receive capital income from distributed profits, however it 
is assumed that they are not able to anticipate it ex ante and therefore it does not enter 
the budget constraint here. The time endowment is normalised to unity, ji
j
i VS −=1 , i.e. 
the unit of time endowment (and labour supply) could be considered as a full-time job.  
                                                 
1 This section follows Bovenberg et al. (2000) and Hinnosaar (2004a, b). However, there is an important 
difference in the aggregate labour supply equation. See Appendix 2 for the details. 
2 The utility from public consumption for a skill group is derived as GgdGg ii 1
1
)( −= δ , where gi is the 
share of the skill group in public consumption. The latter is an exogenous variable. 
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The total labour supply of skill group i is Mi times the labour supply jiS  of one 
household: 
( )
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 (4) 
where m is marginal tax rate on labour income and TA is the tax allowance. Households 
decide the optimal amount of labour supply, however, the participation decisions are 
exogenous. Total labour supply Si of skill group i implies that in the end Si households 
from that skill group are supposed to supply all their labour in the model and the rest are 
considered as inactive. 
In this framework firms decide employment Ei, which therefore equals the labour 
demanded Ni. Some households are unemployed and receive instead of labour earnings 
unemployment benefits Bi (also taxed). Aggregate (realised) private consumption C is 
equal to labour income, unemployment benefits and capital income, all net of taxes: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )∑ Π−+−+−= i iiBiiiLi mUBtEWtPC 111  (5) 
where Ui is the number of unemployed (also corresponding to full-time jobs) and Π is 
aggregate capital income. Note that the marginal tax rate is constant and not dependent 
on income type or skill group. In fact, all income is taxed in a common framework and 
tax allowance is in principle applied to total income. However, it is assumed that the tax 
allowance is assigned to either labour income or unemployment benefits and both 
exceed that, so that any additional income, i.e. capital income, must be taxed in full 
extent. The different average tax rates for labour income and unemployment benefits are 
due to the different underlying amounts. 
2.2. Firms 
This section is based on Alho (2006). There is monopolistic competition in the economy 
between identical firms. Firms use two aggregate production inputs – capital and labour 
– to produce one homogenous good. The aggregate production function is a CES 
function implying constant returns to scale: 
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[ ]σσσ αα 1)1( LKAQ −+=  (6) 
where A is total factor productivity, K capital stock, L aggregate effective labour input, 
α a distribution parameter and )1(1 σ−  the substitution elasticity between capital and 
aggregate effective labour.  
The aggregate demand Q* in the international market depends on the international price 
level ε−∗∗ = )(, PbQP D , where 0>ε . Firms maximise profits, which assuming Cournot 
competition leads to the demand for effective labour input: 
( )LCQ
Q
Q
P
Q
dQ
dPP L =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +∗∗
∗
∗
∗
∗ 1  (7) 
where QL is the marginal productivity of aggregate labour, hQQ =∗  the market share 
of domestic firms and ( )LC  is the aggregate unit labour cost. This can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( )LCQhP L =− −∗ 11 ε  (8) 
where ( )11 −− εh  is the inverse of the mark-up. This determines the employment. The 
capital stock remains fixed as we concentrate only on the short-medium run.  
Aggregate effective labour input L is a CES aggregate of labour demanded in each skill 
group Ni: 
( )[ ] 1,1 ≤= ∑ φφφi ii NeL  (9) 
Here, ei is the relative efficiency/productivity parameter of the skill group i with e1 fixed 
to unity and )1(1 φ− is the substitution elasticity of skill groups. The gross wage rate is 
Wi, but the corresponding cost to the employer, i.e. the producer wage, is 
ii WvNC )1()( += , where v is the rate of employers’ compulsory social security 
contribution. Setting up and solving a cost minimisation problem gives us the relative 
demand for the different skill groups (see Appendix 3 for the derivation): 
( )
( )
1
111
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
φφ
N
N
e
e
NC
NC iii , i = 2, 3 (10) 
and the aggregate unit labour cost: 
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2.3. Wage formation 
Similarly to Alho (2006) we consider several wage formation hypotheses. First, fixed 
wages reflecting the first reactions in the (very) short run after a tax-benefit policy 
change. Second, market determined wages corresponding to a flexible labour market 
with market clearing in the medium run (capital still fixed). Third, we consider a case of 
wage bargaining. The first two settings are perhaps closer to the actual situation in the 
Estonian labour market within the respective time horizon; the last one is somewhat 
more hypothetical, reflecting the old EU member states. 
The case of fixed wages is the easiest to model, requiring only the relevant constraint in 
the model. Market determined wages need an additional restriction related to 
unemployment, which otherwise would not exist in the model. Here, unemployment 
rates have been fixed under market determined wages. Bargained wages are determined 
by a right-to-manage model, which is as follows, being a combination of approaches by 
Hinnosaar (2004a, b) and Alho (2006). 
The employers’ organisation and three unions each representing workers of one skill 
group bargain over wages and employers determine employment. This implies 
maximising the following Nash function: 
ii
ii
ββ −ΓΛ=Ω 1  (12) 
where  
( ) KdEWvLKPQ
i ii
)(1),( +−+−=Λ ∑ ρ  (13) 
and  
( ) ( )[ ] 5.05.0 11 iBiiLiii BtWtE −−−=Γ  (14) 
Λ stands for the total profit of the employers’ organisation and Γi represents the utility 
of the union; ρ denotes the rate of return on capital and d the depreciation rate. It is 
assumed that the union attaches equal weight to employment and the surplus from 
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working, i.e. the real consumer wage less the reservation wage what is simply the after-
tax unemployment benefit. The parameter βi denotes the relative bargaining power of 
the employers. Solving the Nash function gives the following wage equation of skill 
group i (see Appendix 4 for the derivation): 
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )ii
ij jji
i
ii
i Ev
KdEWvLKQPB
W β
ρβ
β
β
++
+−+−−++=
∑ ≠∗
11
)(1),(1
15.0
 (15) 
Note that bargained wages do not depend on the marginal tax rate. This is due to the fact 
that wages and benefits are taxed in the same manner, applying the same marginal tax 
rate and tax allowance. This implies that if the employers’ organisation dictates the 
outcome, 1=iβ , the wage is suppressed down to the reservation wage, i.e. the 
unemployment benefit, ii BW = . In case a labour union dominates the bargaining, 
0=iβ , all the production surplus is attributed to wage income: 
( )
( ) i
ij jj
i Ev
KdEWvLKQP
W +
+−+−= ∑ ≠∗
1
)(1),( ρ
 (16) 
2.4. Government 
The government runs a balanced budget, spending collected tax revenues on 
unemployment benefits and public consumption. There is a universal income tax 
applied on all income, including unemployment benefits, with constant marginal tax 
rate. Yet, income taxation is progressive due to income tax allowance. It is applied to 
either labour earnings or benefits, depending on which of these a household is receiving, 
which are assumed to be sufficiently large so that the tax allowance could be utilised 
fully. Therefore, the rest of the income, namely capital income in the form of distributed 
corporate profits, is subject to full taxation. The average tax rate on labour earnings 
could be denoted as  
( )
i
A
iL
i W
TWmt −=  (17) 
and the average tax rate on unemployment benefits as 
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( )
i
A
iB
i B
TBmt −=  (18) 
where TA is the amount of tax allowance. Additionally, there is a compulsory social 
security contribution on employers with a constant rate of v. No value-added tax is used. 
Government uses its resources to finance unemployment benefits and the rest is spent 
on public consumption. Unemployment benefits are indexed to the gross wage rate, 
ii rWB = , where r is the pre-tax replacement rate. Overall, the government budget is: 
[ ] PGmUBtEWtv
i ii
B
iii
L
i =Π+−−+∑ )1()(  (19) 
3. Calibration 
The model has been calibrated to the Estonian economy in 2004. Input data and 
parameters are shown in Table 1. Labour market data and gross wage rates have been 
derived from the Labour Force Survey (Statistical Office of Estonia, 2004). There is a 
population of 830.1 thousand of persons in working age (16 to pension age). This is 
divided into three skill groups based on educational level (below upper secondary, 
upper secondary and tertiary): low-skilled, skilled and high-skilled. Labour force 
participation rates across the skill groups are, respectively, 42.4%, 76.6% and 88.2%, 
and unemployment rates 20.8%, 11.0% and 5.4%. The gross wage rate for skilled and 
high-skilled is higher by respectively 19% and 33% than that of low-skilled workers. 
Although hourly data would have been preferred, it was not available, therefore labour 
market data is presented in persons and wage rates are unadjusted for part-time working. 
Total production is 141.5 billion of EEK (Statistical Office of Estonia, 2006) and the 
level of capital stock is 211 billion of EEK, both in nominal values of 2004. The capital 
stock is estimated using the Perpetual Inventory Method, where the capital stock equals 
initial capital stock and past investments less the depreciation. It is assumed that the 
initial capital stock was 1.5 times the residual value of fixed assets on enterprise balance 
sheets at the end of 1992. The capital stock was then calculated assuming annual 
depreciation rate of 10% and using fixed investment deflator. The same depreciation 
rate was also used later for the calculation of aggregate profits. The model is set up for a 
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small open economy, where domestic price level follows the international price level. 
The latter has been fixed to unity. 
The parameters characterising the tax-benefit system in the model are the following: the 
marginal income tax rate m is 26%, the annual income tax allowance TA is 16,800 EEK 
and the social security contribution rate for employers v is 33%. Under current 
unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance and social assistance system, the 
gross replacement rate is 50% for the first 100 days, 40% for the following 80 days and 
after that about 15% for effectively unlimited duration. Here it is assumed that all 
unemployed are entitled to the highest replacement rate. Therefore, unemployment 
benefits gross replacement rate r in the model is 50%.  
 
Table 1. Input data for model calibration 
Labour marketa   
Population M1 = 148.7    M2 = 464.9   M3 = 216.5  
Employment E1 =  50.0     E2 = 316.9    E3 = 180.7  
Unemployment U1 =  13.1   U2 = 39.0  U3 = 10.3  
Gross wage ratesb W1 =  53.0   W2 = 63.0  W3 = 83.6  
National accountsc   Q = 141.5      K =211.0   
Tax-benefit rules M = 0.26    TA =16.8b    ν = 0.33    r = 0.5 
Parameters α = 0.5  φ = 2  σ = 0.8 δ = 2 
a Thousands of persons (in working age – 16 to pension age). 
b Thousands EEK (annually). 
c Billions EEK 
The substitution elasticity between the skill categories, 2=φ , and the substitution 
elasticity of capital and aggregate labour, 8.0=σ , are derived from Alho (2006). 
Although the models and the underlying economies are different, we use those as no 
estimates for Estonian economy are currently available. The distribution parameter α in 
the production function is set to 0.4. The substitution elasticity of consumption and 
leisure δ is set equal to 2, following Hinnosaar (2004a, b). 
Calibrated data implies that in the initial equilibrium, total factor productivity is 4.06 
and the rate of return on capital is 21.4%. The mark-up factor is 1.92, which is relatively 
high, on the other hand there is no value-added tax present in the model. Calibrated 
parameters and some important variables for the skill groups are presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Calibrated parameters and variables by the skill types 
 Low-
skilled Skilled 
High-
skilled 
Parameters    
The relative efficiency of a skill group, ie  1.00 8.96 8.99 
The bargaining power of employers, iβ  0.88 0.49 0.56 
The distribution parameter in the utility function, δ1id  0.15 0.27 0.34 
The share of a skill group in public consumption, gi 0.18 0.56 0.26 
    
Variables    
The share of a skill group in capital income 0.07 0.53 0.40 
Average income tax rate on labour earnings, Lit  17.8% 19.1% 20.8% 
Average income tax rate on unemployment benefits, Bit   9.5% 12.1% 15.6% 
 
There is only a marginal difference between the relative efficiency of skilled and high-
skilled labour. The group of skilled has even stronger bargaining power compared to the 
high-skilled. Each skill group’s share in public consumption is assumed to be 
proportional to the number of respective households and therefore being exogenous. 
The share in capital income is proportional to the aggregate wage earnings. Finally, the 
values of the distribution parameter in the utility function reflect that those with higher 
skills attribute a larger weight to consumption. This is due to higher unemployment 
among lower skill groups, which in this framework translates (partly) into stronger 
preferences for leisure.  
4. Policy simulations 
4.1. Description 
There are four policy scenarios evaluated under all three wage systems, altogether up to 
9 different simulations (some provide the same results). The following policy changes 
are considered: 
1) lowering the marginal income tax rate, 
2) increasing the income tax allowance, 
3) lowering employers’ social security contributions, 
4) increasing the replacement rate. 
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All policy simulations are financed by an ex-ante reduction in the level of public 
consumption by 0.5%. In terms of tax-benefit parameters this implies that (a) marginal 
income tax rate is lowered from 0.26 to 0.222, (b) tax allowance is increased from 
16,800 to 17,577 EEK per year, (c) employers’ social tax rate is decreased from 0.33 to 
0.327, and (d) unemployment benefit replacement rate is increased from 0.5 to 0.541.  
The two first policy shifts imitate actual income tax reforms in 2003 and 2005, which 
will reduce the marginal income tax rate from 26% to 20% and double the annual tax 
allowance from 12,000 to 24,000 EEK once fully implemented. However, here we do 
not follow the actual policy changes in their exact magnitude as the different 
simulations are balanced in fiscal terms in order to retain comparability. The latter two 
scenarios are more hypothetical, carried out as the main alternatives. No simulation of 
targeted policy changes in the form of e.g. a higher replacement rate for the low-skilled 
have been undertaken. The results are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Simulation results, percentage changes 
(1)  
Lower mar-
ginal income 
tax rate 
(2) 
Increased 
income tax 
allowance 
(3) 
Lower employers’ 
social security 
contribution 
(4) 
Increased 
replacement 
rate 
Policy scenarios 
 
 
Target variables F, B M F, B M F M B F, M B
Production 0.0 0.9 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.7
Private consumption 4.7 6.0 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 -3.5
Public consumption -9.6 -7.1 -0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -8.4
Social welfare 0.8 1.8 0.0 -0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 -2.8
 - low-skilled 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 -2.0
 - skilled 0.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 -2.8
 - high-skilled 1.3 2.5 0.0 -0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 -2.9
Labour supply 1.8 1.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4
 - low-skilled 5.7 4.3 -0.6 -0.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.3
 - skilled 1.7 1.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4
 - high-skilled 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Employment 0.0 1.5 0.0 -0.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 -4.0
 - low-skilled 0.0 4.3 0.0 -0.5 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 -4.0
 - skilled 0.0 1.5 0.0 -0.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 -4.0
 - high-skilled 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.0
Unemployment 17.5 2.0 -1.5 -0.2 -5.4 0.1 0.7 0.0 39.0
 - low-skilled 27.6 4.3 -3.0 -0.5 -2.4 0.1 0.9 0.0 21.2
 - skilled 15.1 1.5 -1.1 -0.1 -5.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 36.0
 - high-skilled 13.7 0.7 -0.8 0.0 -10.9 0.0 0.6 0.0 73.2
Gross wage rate  
 - low-skilled -1.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.6
 - skilled -0.6 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.6
 - high-skilled 
fixed 
-0.2
fixed
0.0
fixed
0.2 0.3 
fixed 
1.6
Unemployment ratea 1.6 -0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.0 3.9
 - low-skilled 4.3 -0.5 -0.5 0.2 0.0 4.1
 - skilled 1.4 -0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.0 3.9
 - high-skilled 0.7 
fixed
0.0
fixed 
-0.6
fixed
0.0 0.0 3.9
Note: F – fixed wages, M – market determined wages, B – wage bargaining. 
a Absolute changes in percentage points. 
4.2. Lowering the marginal income tax rate 
We can indeed observe increased private consumption with a lower marginal income 
tax rate. On the other hand, tax revenues decline and therefore public consumption is 
smaller. The overall impact on welfare depends on the social welfare function used. In 
this case private and public consumption share the same distribution parameter and 
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social welfare also increases. Across the skill groups, more skilled persons gain more as 
they have higher preference for their consumption (see the comments in Section 3). 
In case of fixed (gross) wages only consumer wages decrease, producer wages do not 
react and therefore production and labour demand will not be affected. Higher consumer 
wages increase the labour supply. But employment is determined by the firms and 
constant (as the producer wages are fixed), and the increased labour supply translates 
one-to-one into higher unemployment. 
Market determined wages are more flexible and the gross wage rate must decrease for 
the unemployment rates to be unchanged. Therefore, the gains from reduced labour 
taxes are shared between employers and employees. As producer wages decrease, more 
labour is demanded and higher employment levels are attained. In the new equilibrium, 
unemployment levels are only slightly higher and unemployment ratios are the same. 
Yet, production also increases and therefore private consumption and social welfare 
increase more than under fixed wages. 
The wage bargaining case has the same outcome as fixed wages because the bargained 
wages do not depend on the marginal tax rate. The lower marginal tax rate only 
increases the labour supply, which has no (direct) effect on employment.  
4.3. Increasing the income tax allowance 
A larger income tax allowance also increases households’ disposable income. However, 
the effect on the labour supply is exactly the opposite now. Under fixed wages this 
transforms into lower unemployment as production and employment are not affected. 
Private consumption increases a little, but the overall effect on social welfare is only 
marginal. In case of market determined wages the decrease in labour supply is smaller. 
This in turn requires a decline in employment and a lower gross wage rate. Production 
also decreases and the overall effect on social welfare remains negative. Wage 
bargaining yields again the same results as fixed wages. 
4.4. Lowering employers’ social security contributions 
Reducing the labour tax burden by lowering employers’ social security contributions 
has a direct effect on labour demand and employment, but not on labour supply. Lower 
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labour costs increase production and employment. Again, as there is no mechanism 
linking labour demand and supply, the latter remains unchanged with fixed wages and 
unemployment declining. Higher employment and production increase private and 
public consumption, therefore rising social welfare as well. 
Fixed unemployment rates are attained via higher consumer wages and increased labour 
supply, which makes this policy scenario less favourable under market determined 
wages. Production increases only marginally, private consumption increases less than 
under fixed wages and public consumption even decreases. Overall, social welfare is 
somewhat higher.  
This time wage bargaining leads to a different result compared to fixed wages, in fact 
being closer to the outcome of market determined wages. The initial decrease in 
producer wages transforms to higher gross wage rates. In the new equilibrium, producer 
wages, employment and production have returned to initial levels. Higher consumer 
wages attract additional labour supply causing unemployment levels to rise. Overall, 
there is a small increase in private consumption, a small decrease in public consumption 
and only a marginal improvement in social welfare. 
4.5. Increasing the replacement rate 
The increased replacement rate combined with either fixed wages or market determined 
wages only implies slightly higher private consumption and social welfare. The reason 
is that neither firms nor households take into account the extent of unemployment 
benefits in their optimising behaviour. It does not affect labour costs for the firms and 
households supply labour without considering the outside option. Unemployed 
households are exogenously decided and therefore they do not take into account 
unemployment benefits when choosing optimal labour to supply.  
Under wage bargaining, higher unemployment benefits directly increase gross wage 
rates, which in turn increases labour supply. Higher labour costs lower firms’ demand 
for labour and therefore the employment level. As replacement rate is uniform across 
the skill groups, the percentage changes in the gross wage rates and employment are 
also the same. All this results in significantly higher unemployment, decreased 
production, lower private and public consumption and lower social welfare. 
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5. Conclusions 
The policy simulations considered show that alternative ways to “stimulate” the labour 
market can lead to very different outcomes, e.g. on labour supply and unemployment. 
An improvement in terms of households’ disposable income might even turn out to be 
welfare reducing in the new equilibrium. The effects of policy changes also vary under 
different wage formation schemes – lowering the marginal income tax rate is for 
example most effective in enhancing private consumption and social welfare under 
market determined wages while a reduction in the social tax rate works most 
successfully under fixed wages. A combination of lowering marginal income tax rate 
and increasing tax allowance, basically the recent tax reform, has a potential to increase 
production and social welfare without increasing unemployment rates under market 
determined wages.   
Overall, the results are often similar to Hinnosaar (2004b) and Alho (2006) on which 
our model is based. In comparison with the latter, the main differences occur where our 
simulations yield identical results under various wage systems, highlighting some limits 
of our model. However, assuming that different wage formations are relevant for 
Estonian and Finnish economies (market determined wages and bargained wages, 
respectively), we can stress the need for different labour market and tax-benefit policies 
in different EU member states. Comparing the policy scenarios for Estonia under 
market determined wages and wage bargaining implies that market determined wages 
outperform bargained wages, the latter representing more EU-like wage formation.  
Although no policy scenarios targeted at specific skill groups were carried out, some 
implications could be still noted. The labour supply of low-skilled is most effectively 
increased by lowering the marginal income tax rate, valid under every wage scheme.  
Combining this in turn with strategies improving employment in general, e.g. lowering 
employers’ social security contributions, could potentially improve the labour market 
position of those with lower skills. 
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Appendix 1. A comparison of CGE models 
 
Model Bovenberg et al. (2000) 
Tax reform and the Dutch labor 
market: an applied general 
equilibrium approach, Journal of 
Public Economics, No 78, 2000, 
pp. 193-214. 
Hinnosaar, M. (2004) 
a) Estonian Labor Market 
Institutions within a General 
Equilibrium Framework, Eesti 
Pank, No 5, 2004. 
b) The Impact of Benefit and Tax 
Reforms on Estonian Labor 
Market in a General Equilibrium 
Framework, University of Tartu, 
Working Paper, No 31, 2004. 
Alho, K. (2006) 
Labour market institutions and the 
effectiveness of tax and benefit 
policies in enhancing 
employment: a general 
equilibrium analysis. ETLA 
Discussion paper, No 1008. 
The current paper 
A Comparative General 
Equilibrium Analysis of the 
Estonian Labour Market. 
PRAXIS,  Working Paper. 
Back-
ground 
A simplification of MIMIC (a 
larger applied general equilibrium 
model for the Dutch economy). 
Based largely on Bovenberg et al. 
(2000), without informal labour 
market, job matching and hiring 
costs. The wage formation for 
high-skilled workers is based on 
the efficiency wage concept.  
Some similar elements with 
Bovenberg et al. (2000) (job 
matching and hiring costs). 
Additional input in production – 
capital. 
Based on Hinnosaar (2004a, b) 
and Alho (2006). 
House-
holds 
Three types of households: 
capitalists, unskilled and skilled 
households. Capitalists do not 
supply labour and receive all 
profit income. Participation 
decisions are exogenous, 
households choose the number of 
working hours. Households of 
each skill type maximise utility, 
subject to a budget and a time 
constraint (public consumption 
additively separable). 
As in Bovenberg et al. (2000), 
except no hiring costs and tax 
progressivity due to tax allowance, 
not tax credit. 
 
Three types of skill groups (low-
skilled, skilled and high-skilled), 
each divided further as employed 
on market-based terms, employed 
on subsidised terms, unemployed 
and those outside the labour force. 
Individuals maximise utility 
subject to a budget and a time 
constraint: 
As in Hinnosaar (2004a, b). Three 
skill groups instead of two. 
 
Workers receive distributed 
corporate profits, although it is not 
considered in labour supply (not 
anticipated). 
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Decisions to participate in the 
labour market and to supply 
labour are considered 
simultaneously. Unemployment 
benefits are means-tested. 
Firms Two types of domestic firms, 
according to the type of labour 
employed (unskilled, skilled). The 
number of firms is fixed. A linear 
production function, jii
j
i LhY = . 
Profit maximisation implies under 
monopolistic competition output 
prices (mark-up over marginal 
costs): 
ii
i
j
i
j
i Nj
sui
h
WP
...1
,
,
1
1
=
=
−= ε  
 
Commodities produced by 
identical firms are aggregated into 
two composite commodities and 
those are aggregated further into 
overall production. The optimal 
allocation of two composite 
commodities is an implicit 
demand function for skilled and 
unskilled labour. 
As in Bovenberg et al. (2000), 
except producer wage includes 
employer’s compulsory social 
security contributions. 
 
i
sij
i h
TWP )1(
1
1 +
−= ε   
 
 
Identical monopolistic firms. CES 
aggregate production function is [ ] σσσ αα /1)1( LKAQ −+= . Profit 
maximisation under Cournot 
competition implies aggregate 
labour demand: 
CPtQh QL =−− − *1 )1()1( ε . 
In the long run capital stock also 
adjusts: *KCLQPQ ρ=− . 
Labour input in each skill 
group: [ ] χχχ /1iiii MaLN += . The 
relative demand for two 
components (trough cost 
minimisation): 
χχ −
−
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−+= 1
1
1
1
)1(
)1)(1(
L
i
i
M
i
i
i
i
u
sva
L
M . 
Aggregate labour input is [ ] φφ /1
1
)(∑= I ii NeL  and the 
As in Alho (2006), except no 
subsidised labour. 
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relative demand for each skill 
group is 
( ) ( ) 1111)()( −= φφ NNeeNCNC iii  
Goods 
market 
There are two aggregate goods on 
the highest level: (a) a CES 
aggregate of domestic composite 
commodities produced by skilled 
and unskilled workers, (b) a 
composite of imported 
commodities. 
As in Bovenberg et al. (2000). A single tradable good, both in 
private and in public consumption. 
As in Alho (2006). 
Labour 
market 
Realised employment equals to 
labour demanded and 
unemployment is the difference 
between labour supply and labour 
demand (both in terms of hours). 
 
Wage bargaining for both skill 
type labour (a right-to manage 
model). The reservation wage is a 
weighted average of opportunity 
wages in formal and informal 
sector, introducing some real 
wage resistance, i.e. higher tax 
rates or hiring costs only partly 
borne by workers. Additionally, 
job matching with hiring costs. 
Determination of employment and 
unemployment as in Bovenberg et 
al. (2000). 
 
Wage bargaining for low-skilled 
workers as in Bovenberg et al. 
(2000), except no informal labour 
market, job matching or hiring 
costs. The reservation wage is 
simply unemployment benefit. 
 
High-skilled workers receive an 
efficiency wage depending 
(among others) on unemployment 
benefit and unemployment. 
 
Job matching similar to 
Bovenberg et al. (2000), 
establishing a link between labour 
demand and labour supply. Firms 
decide employment.  
 
Several wage formations 
considered: 
a) fixed wages, 
b) market determined wages, 
c) wage bargaining in each skill 
group, 
d) nation-wide wage bargaining. 
 
Three wage structures considered: 
a) fixed wages, 
b) market determined wages, 
c) wage bargaining as in 
Hinnosaar (2004a, b). 
Govern-
ment 
Government runs a balanced 
budget with revenue from taxing 
labour incomes and expenditure 
on unemployment benefits and 
public consumption. The latter 
featuring the same composition 
As in Bovenberg et al. (2000), 
except government revenues 
include also employers’ compul-
sory social security contributions. 
Tax progressivity due to tax 
allowance not tax credit. 
Balanced budget. Tax revenues 
from income tax (with progressive 
rates) on labour income, 
unemployment benefits and 
capital income, social security tax 
and value-added tax. Government 
Balanced budget. Government 
revenues from labour and capital 
taxation (income and social tax). 
No value-added tax. Government 
expenditures on unemployment 
benefits and public consumption. 
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and price index as private 
consumption. 
Unemployment benefits combine 
subsistence benefit and universal 
unemployment benefit.  
expenditures on unemployment 
benefits, wage subsidies and 
public consumption. 
Unemployment benefit is a fixed 
proportion of gross wage. 
 
Foreign 
sector 
The allocation of foreign 
consumption over domestic and 
foreign goods depends on the 
terms of trade. The market of 
domestic goods is in equilibrium. 
As in Bovenberg et al. (2000). Demand for domestic products 
depends on the international price 
level (given for a small open 
economy). Otherwise not 
explicitly modelled. 
As in Alho (2006). 
Data 
and the 
key 
para-
meters 
Dutch economy in 2018. 
 
Substitution elasticity between 
skill groups 1.5, substitution 
elasticity of consumption and 
leisure 4, uncompensated wage 
elasticity 0.15, income elasticity -
0.05, export elasticity -2. 
Estonian economy in 2001, import 
structure from 1997. 
 
Substitution elasticity between 
skill groups 0.5, substitution 
elasticity of consumption and 
leisure 2, Armington elasticity and 
transformation elasticity 2. 
Finnish economy in 2002. 
 
Substitution elasticity between 
skill groups 2, substitution 
elasticity of capital and aggregate 
labour 0.8, distribution parameter 
in production function 0.4, 
substitution elasticity of 
consumption and leisure 0.5. 
Estonian economy in 2004. 
 
Substitution elasticity between 
skill groups 2, substitution 
elasticity of capital and aggregate 
labour 0.8, distribution parameter 
in production function 0.5, 
substitution elasticity of 
consumption and leisure 2. 
Simula-
tions 
1) Lowering marginal tax rate 
(benefits indexed to consumer 
wages) 
2) Higher tax credit for all 
households (benefits indexed 
to consumer wages) 
3) Higher tax credit for all 
households (benefits indexed 
to producer wages) 
4) Higher tax credit for unskilled 
workers (benefits indexed to 
producer wages) 
5) Higher tax credit for all 
workers, higher marginal tax 
rate, skilled workers break 
Hinnosaar 2004a: 
1) Higher union bargaining 
power, i.e. higher wage for 
low-skilled workers 
2) Higher unemployment benefits 
replacement rate for all 
workers 
3) Higher unemployment benefits 
replacement rate for high-
skilled workers 
4) Increasing tax allowance for 
all workers 
5) Increasing tax allowance for 
low-skilled workers 
 
1) Lowering income tax rate 
a) average (and marginal) 
b) marginal (only) 
2) Lowering employers’ social 
security contributions for 
a) all skill groups 
b) low-skilled workers 
3) Higher wage subsidy rates 
4) Lower unemployment benefit 
replacement rates 
5) Reducing unemployment in a 
fully flexible labour market 
 
Financed by ex ante decrease in 
public consumption by 0.5% in 1) 
1) Lowering marginal income tax 
rate 
2) Increasing tax allowance 
3) Lowering employers’ social 
security contributions 
4) Increasing replacement rate. 
 
Financed ex ante decrease in 
public consumption by 0.5%. 
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even ex ante (benefits indexed 
to producer wages) 
 
Financed by ex ante reduction in 
public consumption (0.5% GDP). 
Hinnosaar (2004b), reforms 
financed by ex ante decrease in 
public consumption by 0.5%: 
1) Lowering marginal tax rate 
2)-5) As in Hinnosaar (2004a). 
and 2), 0.07% in 3), 0.18% in 4). 
Results Paper demonstrates various trade-
offs facing tax reforms. 
Simulations highlight in-work 
benefits as an effective instrument 
against unemployment. 
Reducing tax burden via targeted 
increase in tax allowance has the 
most favourable impact on the 
labour market. 
Simulations show that wage 
formation is an important factor 
for employment enhancing 
policies. In some cases the 
expansionary effects are even the 
largest under wage bargaining. 
Simulations show that market 
determined wages outperform 
bargained wages. The labour 
market position of the low-skilled 
could be improved most 
effectively by lowering the 
marginal tax rate and employers’ 
social security contributions. 
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Appendix 2. Labour supply 
 
Individuals maximise the CES sub-utility function  
( ) ( ) ( ) 11111 1),( −−− ⎥⎦
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⎡ −+= δ
δ
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δ
δ j
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j
i VdCdVCh  (20) 
subject to the time constraint ji
j
i VS −=1 and the budget constraint 
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j
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L
i PCSWt =− )1(  (21) 
Substituting constraints into the utility function: 
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Solving for labour supply3:  
( ) ( )( ) ( )⇒−=−+−− −−− jiiAjii
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Total labour supply is  
( )
( )
( ) δµµ
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−==
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111,
11
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3 Note that this is different compared to Bovenberg et al. (2000) and Hinnosaar (2004a, b). There a 
household’s labour supply was also expressed in terms of average tax rate, which in return depends on 
household’s labour supply. 
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Appendix 3. Labour cost 
 
The aggregate labour cost minimisation problem: 
( )∑= i iiN NNCC imin  (27) 
subject to 
( )[ ] LNe
i ii
=∑ φφ 1  (28) 
The Lagrangian function is: 
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Sum over ( )jini ≠= ...1  and add one to both side for ji = : 
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Substitute (27) and (28) into (32), solve for Nj: 
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Solve for aggregate labour cost, C: 
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Aggregate unit labour cost ( 1=L ): 
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Appendix 4. Wage bargaining 
 
The Nash function to be maximised is 
ii
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ββ −ΓΛ=Ω 1  (37) 
where 
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Note that ( ) ( ) ( ) AiiLiiALi mTWmWtWTmt +−=−⇒−= 111 . The unions do not take into 
account that benefits depend on wage (otherwise employees would claim very high 
wage and be unemployed). 
Simplifying yields: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ⇒Λ−−=−−−+ mBtWtEv iiBiiLiii 115.011)1( ββ  (41) 
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]⇒+−+−−++= +−++ ∑ ≠∗ KdEWvLKQPEBv EWvEWv ij jjiiii iiiiii )(1),(15.0)1( 115.0)1( ρββ ββ  (42) 
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )ii
ij jji
i
ii
i Ev
KdEWvLKQPBW β
ρβ
β
β
++
+−+−−++=
∑ ≠∗
11
)(1),(1
15.0
 (43) 
In case 1=iβ  then ii BW = , if 0=iβ  then 
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